“This incident is absolutely not a fluke. U.S. military personnel and infrastructure — both abroad and at home — are going to be exposed to drone attacks, and we can expect the sophistication of the technology and tactics to increase,” Caitlin Lee, director of RAND’s Acquisition and Technology Policy Program, told DefenseScoop this week.

Led by U.S. Central Command, the Defense Department’s investigation is ongoing and government officials have not yet shared a full assessment of what happened in the strike. 

But according to initial reports, a kamikaze drone flew near service members’ living quarters at a small base in Jordan called Tower 22 at the same time as a U.S. surveillance drone — and essentially confused American forces, resulting in no air defenses being deployed.

“Our teammates were killed by radical militias backed by Iran and operating inside Syria and Iraq. In the aftermath of the vile Hamas terrorist assault on Israel on October 7th, terrorist groups backed by Iran and funded by Iran have tried to create even more turmoil, including the Houthis attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told reporters during a Pentagon press briefing on Thursday.

“This particular attack was egregious in that, you know, the attack was on the sleeping area of … our base. And again, Kata’ib Hezbollah and other elements continue to attack our troops. And again, I think, at this point we should — it’s time to take away even more capability than we’ve taken in the past,” Austin said.

In separate discussions with DefenseScoop this week, four defense experts shed light on the state of America’s sensing and air defense capabilities, and how global war on terrorism (GWOT) technologies might need to be adapted or enhanced to thwart the increasing sophistication of adversaries’ weapons and forces.

‘A threat we must respect’

For Patrick “Krown” Killingsworth, director of autonomy product at EpiSci, the “loss” associated with the Jan. 28 drone assault is heartbreaking and “has a personal poignancy.”

“As a former USAF F-15C and F-22 pilot I was a member of an air dominance community that dedicated their lives to protecting American and allied forces from aerial attack. We took an immense amount of pride in the fact that no U.S. forces had been killed by enemy air action since April 15th, 1953,” Killingsworth told DefenseScoop. 

Building on prior expertise as an Air Force fighter pilot and test pilot, Killingsworth now works to help deliver trusted autonomy solutions for the DOD. 

To him, this latest attack in Jordan demonstrates that while the U.S. must maintain advantage against high-end threats, the tactical capabilities of widely proliferated drones must also be taken very seriously at this time. 

“Unmanned aerial systems pose a threat that is a significant departure from those that we’ve historically been concerned with — but will be a characteristic of any future conflict and the U.S. must invest in the resources to prepare for the future fight,” Killingsworth said. 

“Also, I would point out that we should not yet classify the drone as ‘undetected,’ all that’s clear now is that it wasn’t successfully intercepted,” he added.

The experts who spoke to DefenseScoop generally agreed that what happened on Jan. 28 can be considered representative of the rapidly evolving technologies that are being deployed in a range of different conflict areas.

“This is not something we should categorize as a one-off attack. The capability for similar attacks in the region almost certainly exists — it’s a threat we must respect. The combat utility of these systems is undeniable, and the United States must make sure that we too take advantage of capabilities they can bring to our own forces,” Killingsworth said.

To Tarek Abdelzaher — a professor of computer science at the University of Illinois’ Grainger College of Engineering, who also leads the Internet of Battlefield Things Alliance — the UAS incident was alarming, particularly “because it shows that an adversary can learn to penetrate our defenses by exploiting our own safety systems against us.”

“In this case, as we now know, the base was expecting a friendly drone at the same time as the enemy drone attacked, which caused hesitation and delayed the reaction to the foreign threat,” he noted. “This is very unfortunate.”

A wide variety of UAS-spotting technologies are already available to the Defense Department. 

Capabilities exist that can detect the presence of drones on thermal cameras (because engines are hot), electromagnetic signatures (the fingerprint of drone electronics), or even sound, allowing the defense system to tell a lot about a UAS’ type, speed, and location, according to Abdelzaher. And, the actual detectors and interceptors are not very big — often ranging from something a single soldier can carry to larger vehicle-mounted and shipboard systems. 

“Drone detection is the easy part. The harder problem is to automatically tell with confidence whether this is a friend or a foe, when both are present simultaneously,” he said.

In 2021 — pointing to decreased tensions with Iran — the Biden administration removed several air defense systems from multiple Middle East countries.

Still, as of October 2023, the U.S. maintains “a significant air defense presence in the Middle East,” including Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems in Saudi Arabia, Patriot surface-to-air missile systems in several countries, and deployments of F-16 and other aircraft across the region, Mohammed Soliman, director of the Middle East Institute’s Strategic Technologies and Cyber Security Program, explained.

“Crucially, a vulnerability exists in this deployment: most systems are not currently calibrated to detect kamikaze drones or loitering munitions. Unlike traditional ballistic missiles, these drones fly at lower altitudes and speeds, are smaller and cheaper, and are only detectable at short range,” he said.

That means “industry will need time to develop and deploy new defense systems capable of countering these agile, low-altitude drones,” Soliman told DefenseScoop.

He and some of the other experts suggested that America’s post-9/11 war on terror’s main defense technologies are becoming more and more outdated, and even lagging years behind steady and quickly moving advancements in warfare capabilities.

“Technology advancements haven’t just pushed the boundaries of warfare; they’ve eroded the decades-long monopoly the U.S. held in defense technology, leveling the playing field in worrying ways. Drones epitomize this shift. Cheap, lightweight, targeted, and easily replaced, they pose a significant and often invisible threat. This harsh reality exposes a critical failing: the U.S. military has been, and continues to be, underprepared for the contemporary threat landscape,” Soliman said.

America’s air defense capabilities around the Middle East also include counter-rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) systems. 

“C-RAM is a point defense solution for drone attacks, and there are a variety of others for both detection and interdiction,” Lee said.

Lee — a political scientist and longtime researcher of innovation, force planning, emerging technology and organizational culture — explained that it’s typically not difficult to detect very large drones, provided air defense systems are “turned on.”

However, it’s becoming clear that U.S. adversaries will continue to develop new tactics in the near term to evade detection. 

“For example, they might closely follow the flight path of friendly drones on approach,” Lee said, noting that air defenses at times may be turned off when friendly aircraft are expected to land, creating an opportunity for adversary aircraft to follow closely behind. 

“Small commercial-derivative drones — like the ones used in Ukraine — pose a much harder detection and interdiction challenge. Air defense radars were all originally designed to detect large, fast aircraft — not low-flying, slow and small drones that look like birds or a variety of other flying objects. And even when anti-aircraft systems detect small drones, the cost of shooting them down is much higher than the cost of the drone itself, creating a very unsustainable and unfavorable cost-exchange ratio,” Lee said. 

“The problem is only going to get harder as adversaries start to deploy drone swarms, which could potentially overwhelm air defenses,” she noted.

What is needed

America’s relationship with Iran is evolving, complex and historically tense.

“Iran seeks to operate under a cloak of plausible deniability, providing money, weapons and training to militant groups in the Middle East who share Tehran’s opposition to U.S. interests and objectives in the region. Unmanned systems are perfect weapons to ensure that plausible deniability, and Iran is a top supplier of these weapon systems,” Lee explained. 

The Iranian military backs and equips dozens of militias in the region. But at this point, it’s still unclear how much of a role Iran played in the actual execution of the Jan. 28 attack on U.S. forces.

“Iran’s interests may not always be completely aligned with these militant groups, but so far it has not been willing to turn off the spigot, either, and we can expect militant groups to continue to capitalize on this,” Lee said. 

“China and Turkey are also major drone exporters in the region. Drones are relatively low-cost and easy to operate, making them a weapon of choice for middle powers, non-state actors and individuals who seek to maximize the lethality on a budget. So we can expect to see the global market for combat-capable drones — both military grade and commercially derivative — to continue to grow,” she also noted.

As tensions in and around the Red Sea show no signs of immediately waning, Iran and its proxies are also posing significant cyber threats to U.S. interests, according to some analysts. 

“As the conflict in Gaza persists, and considering Iran’s recent attack on American forces in Jordan and the impending U.S. response, the risk of cyber attacks on U.S. networks and infrastructure — both domestically and internationally — is set to escalate sharply. Iran-based cyberattacks have already jeopardized water and wastewater facilities in several U.S. states by exploiting vulnerabilities in computer systems manufactured by Israel that operate these facilities,” Soliman said.

DefenseScoop asked experts to share suggestions regarding how the U.S. should confront these modern technological threats.

Abdelzaher argued that this incident showcases the importance of having advanced and trustworthy artificial intelligence in the battlefield that can make fast, safe and accurate decisions about threats.

“Weaponized kamikaze drones are becoming a more commonplace tool in today’s conflicts. They significantly reduce the time available for decision-making from when they are detected and before they hit their target. We already have the capability to quickly respond to such threats. The problem is that we do not want a repeat of the ‘Uber story’ when an autonomous car hit a pedestrian because it misidentified them. Therefore, a conservative approach is taken – when in doubt, don’t shoot. Better AI can remove the doubt,” he said.

Lee recommended that the U.S. work to get “left of launch” by targeting emerging drone and missile proliferation networks, like UAS makers, suppliers, and trainers, before future attacks are launched.

“The U.S. has tried to do some of this in response to the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, but that is too little too late. What is needed is a systematic, prolonged U.S.-led campaign to go after drone and missile proliferation networks before they result in attacks. The left of launch approach could involve targeted attacks on drone manufacturers or launch sites, but it could also involve non-kinetic solutions: cyber attacks, interdicting supply lines, and working with allies and partners to crack down on third party drone part suppliers,” Lee said.

In terms of America’s response, she and all the experts DefenseScoop spoke to suggested that while the Pentagon has started to invest in counter-UAS technologies, much more is needed.

“To date, many counter-drone solutions focus on modifying air defense systems to detect and intercept drones. While these are good point solutions, the cost exchange ratio is not favorable. The U.S. needs to consider rapidly fielding lower-cost, more effective solutions in the realms of electromagnetic warfare and laser weapons,” Lee noted.

In Soliman’s view, although the U.S. possesses advanced UAS technology, “its utilization and development have yet to keep pace with the threat landscape.” 

“The underinvestment in sensing and counter-UAS technologies leaves vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit. The recent conflicts in the Middle East serve as stark reminders of this strategic gap,” he said.

Killingsworth, too, stated that the Tower 22 attack spotlights a need for the American military to invest in more robust solutions that can be leveraged and adapted to counter innovations in drone technology in real-time.

“Without a doubt this attack will be studied by a large number of U.S. military tacticians. My hope is that we will understand and apply any lessons learned so that the date of January 28, 2024 is remembered for future generations of air superiority practitioners as the final time that U.S. forces were attacked by an enemy aircraft,” the former Air Force pilot told DefenseScoop. 

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DIU is on the hunt for low-cost platforms that could go into production next year. The aim is to build 10 or more systems per month, which would be an annual production rate of 120 or more robo-boats.

“The Department of the Navy has an operational need for small Unmanned Surface Vehicle (sUSV) interceptors, capable of autonomously transiting hundreds of miles through contested waterspace, loitering in an assigned operating area while monitoring for maritime surface threats, and then sprinting to interdict a noncooperative, maneuvering vessel. Interceptors will need to operate in cohesive groups and execute complex autonomous behaviors that adapt to the dynamic, evasive movements of the pursued vessel,” according to the solicitation.

The Defense Department wants robotic systems that can sail 500-1,000 nautical miles in moderate sea states; haul a payload of 1,000 pounds using diesel fuel; loiter for “several days” while conserving sufficient fuel to return to base; and “sprint” at 35 knots or faster in low sea states.

Other primary focus areas include sense-and-avoid technology that can effectively operate in low-visibility conditions and in areas where global navigation satellite systems are denied; tech that enables maritime drones to autonomously shadow and intercept a vessel of interest; and “collaborative multi-agent autonomy solutions” that allow for the integration of third-party software and hardware.

Among other “highly desired” attributes for the robo-boats is the ability to carry and launch small unmanned aerial systems that could provide additional eyes to look for objects of interest.

To promote stealthiness, DIU is interested in uncrewed platforms that can “automatically adjust emissions control (EMCON) posture when in the vicinity of specific vessels and aircraft, or in specific geographic areas” and “search for, localize, shadow, and intercept a noncooperative, maneuvering vessel of interest using techniques and sensor modalities that minimize probability of detection,” per the solicitation.

For communications, the organization seeks systems that are resistant to radio frequency jamming and use a variety of pathways such as high-bandwidth commercial satcom, 5G and others.

It envisions machine-to-machine data links and mesh networks that enable “collaboration with proximate sUSVs and other unmanned systems, as well as for status reporting with a distant operations center or control station … with minimal track splitting or false positives,” according to the request for solutions.

The Pentagon is keen on using machine learning technologies that can recognize objects and assist with intelligence-gathering, data analysis, or targeting. The DIU solicitation noted that desired attributes for the small USVs include automated recognition tools “for classifying and identifying surface vessels of various types, to include recognition of hull shape, superstructure, masts, and hull markings such as letters and numbers.”

The department also wants robo-ships that can carry a variety “effectors,” per the solicitation. The term “effectors,” in U.S. military parlance, generally refers to weapon systems.

The Navy’s Task Force 59, which is under 5th Fleet, has been using commercial USVs and AI capabilities for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes in operational environments in the Middle East region.

The unit has also been testing the ability of maritime drones to employ weapons. During an exercise in October of last year, it used an unmanned surface vessel to launch loitering munitions against a target boat.

4th Fleet, which operates in Central and South America, has also been experimenting with these types of capabilities as part of its hybrid fleet exercises.

Through the new solicitation, DIU could facilitate a major ramp-up in the Navy’s employment of maritime drones and autonomous systems.

The innovation unit, which is headquartered in Silicon Valley, works to connect the Pentagon with nontraditional contractors and commercial technologies that have military applications. It also aims to move faster than traditional Defense Department acquisition processes, via what it calls a commercial solutions opening, to get companies on contract quickly and move forward with prototyping.

“The Department intends to swiftly prototype and demonstrate one or more sUSV interceptors, aligned with robust commercial capacity to manufacture and deliver these sUSVs at scale,” the solicitation states. “After Government reviews and evaluations are complete, the Government intends to recommend specific pairing arrangements between the selected sUSV interceptor solutions and the selected collaborative multi-agent autonomy solutions.”

Proposed solutions may be expected to appear on a test range as early as 30 days after award of a prototyping agreement, for performance assessments and demonstrations of sense-and-avoid capabilities and autonomous intercept, according to the solicitation.

A follow-on production contract or transaction may be issued by one or more organizations within the Defense Department without further industry competition, it noted.

Systems need to be ready to move into high-rate production beginning in spring 2025, per the solicitation.

Responses from industry are due Feb. 12.

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General plans for the event were first announced in August, but officials shared more details on Wednesday at the annual AUSA conference.

The evaluation, known as Demo 5, is slated for June 2024. Companies’ systems will be tested against a large number of Group 1 and Group 2 drones, which are on the smaller end of the UAS spectrum.

The JCO has been holding a series of counter-UAS demonstrations, but next year’s will involve many more airborne platforms than previous tests.

“We’re going to really test out the vendors this time around, even more so than in the past. They have a threshold objective. That threshold is … 20 Groups 1s and 2s. We’re gonna go as high as an objective of 50. So we’re really going to test out their capability with what they bring to bear and have them detect, track and ID but also have a phase where they can attempt to defeat” the drones, Col. Michael Parent, chief of the JCO’s acquisition and resources division, told DefenseScoop at the AUSA conference.

His team recently evaluated white papers and presentations from vendors. The next downselect will happen in the coming weeks and officials will decide which contractors will be invited to participate in the demo.

Officials haven’t yet decided exactly how many vendors they intend to select.

“It’s actually a little bit too early to tell. And the reason why is because we have a threshold objective, we really want to get to as many as potentially 50 targets. You have to look at what the solutions are, how good do we think they’re really going to be at getting after that … We’re hoping to have about a half dozen [companies]. It could be more though, based on what capabilities are out there. But it also could be less if we don’t really see anything new and novel out there to get after that threat,” Parent told DefenseScoop.

“We know we don’t want anyone to come out with a science project … We want to scrutinize it very thoroughly, make sure that we have the right vendors to go out there. We don’t want to spend money, U.S. government dollars and taxpayer dollars on vendors to go out … that can’t actually get after the threat,” he added.

Potential solutions could include directed energy systems, electronic warfare tools, or “kinetic” weapons that shoot down drones.

“We’re looking at what the vendors have come back with … This time around we didn’t want to limit them,” Parent told reporters. “This time around, we’re pulling back and we’re saying, ‘Come to us with what you have available and then we’ll look at that and we’ll make that determination as we get a little bit closer.’”

However, he noted that the demo could end up heavily featuring high-power microwaves and EW systems because missiles or other kinetic weapons would be “challenged” to take on 20 to 50 drones at a time.

JCO demos are intended to test out technologies that could tackle emerging threats and fill capability gaps. Two recent demos focused on kamikaze drones, which have figured prominently in the Ukraine-Russia war. Next year’s demo will be focused on countering a UAS swarm because that’s another growing threat that the U.S. military is concerned about.

“The threat is looking at ways how can they coordinate mass attacks where you have several hundred of these attacking you at one time, attempting to overwhelm the operator, our radars and saturate our system,” Maj. Gen. Sean Gainey, director of the JCO, noted during a presentation at the AUSA conference.

After next year’s evaluation, “hopefully we’ll have some video [where] instead of seeing one UAS fall out of the sky you’ll see 50 or more fall out of the sky, to continue pushing us on that path moving forward,” he added.

Yuma Proving Ground in Utah has been the venue for previous JCO demonstrations. But next year’s event will take place at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, Parent told DefenseScoop.

“The reason why is because when you start looking at the different potential effectors involved, you really need a range that can take on those types of effectors,” he explained. White Sands appears to fit the bill in that regard.

The drones that are used for the demo may not be systems that were originally designed to operate as autonomous swarms. Instead, the JCO may have many human operators remotely operating a large number of systems in a swarm type of formation, according to Parent.

“One option right now, and the most prominent option, is to actually not use a swarm that’s manufactured to be a swarm because that’s expensive and also no one wants to shoot down their innovative swarm, right,” he told reporters.

If counter-drone prototypes at next year’s demo look promising, there could be follow-on development work and operational assessments.

“We are not in the procurement realm. We’re not in the sustainment realm. We are in the prototyping realm,” Parent said of the JCO. “We have a budget that is for prototyping and … demos. And that’s where it is. And then we have a two-year development cycle, if we do develop something, with a one-year operational assessment and we send something out to the … COCOMS or the services.”

However, the services ultimately decide if they want to move forward and buy specific counter-drone systems, Parent noted.

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DARPA been testing this type of technology.

Since 2017, the agency has conducted at least six field experiments at various locations as part of its Offensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET) program. One of those tests included about 100 drones, Kenneth Plaks, acting director of the agency’s Strategic Technology Office, said Tuesday at the Sea-Air-Space conference at National Harbor, Maryland.

“It looked like the jukebox of the Apocalypse,” he said during a panel discussion. “But even that really doesn’t scale to the numbers we’re talking about” launching in the future.

Another DARPA initiative, the System-of-Systems Enhanced Small Unit (SESU) program, deployed a drone swarm against mockup targets at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona.

“They autonomously divvied up the airspace, found a target, radioed home. And then we launched another drone … with an autonomous seeker” that leveraged technology developed for the Seeker Cost Transformation (SECTR) program, he said.

That drone then navigated without GPS, using visual references on the ground to follow the proper flight path. It autonomously located the designated target, selected the aimpoint, and hit the target within a foot of that aimpoint, according to Plaks.

He envisions a scenario in which 1,000 drones could be part of a swarm.

“By having 1,000 different things that can hit a target, as a defender what do you defend against?” he said. “If you try to defend all of them, you’re going to spend all your resources on the first volley and have nothing left. So that is a way of imposing complexity and kind of a death-of-a-thousand-cuts type of a scenario upon the nation’s adversaries.”

However, there are challenges involved in that type of operation.

“Command and control of all these vehicles is important,” he said.

For example, launching and recovering massive numbers of UAS is “really hard,” Plaks said, noting that launching just a few dozen manned planes during Air Force exercises is time-consuming.

“It takes an hour just to get everybody marshaled and on and off the runway. Now how do you launch and control 1,000 [unmanned] aircraft?” he said.

However, the challenges involved in deploying that large of a swarm aren’t insurmountable, according to Plaks.

“It’s certainly doable, I think, within the next five years. I don’t see any technical impediments, especially if they’re highly autonomous” UAS, he told FedScoop.

“You’re not going to do this with like a Predator-style drone where you’re actually hand-flying the drone,” he explained. “The real question is … do you have the autonomy to actually accomplish the mission?”

A human will still need to be somewhere in the decision-making loop when it comes to missions that involve launching weapons, Plaks asserted.

“ISR is one thing and that’s kind of easy,” he said, referring to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. “If you’re going to use lethal force, there has to be a human being in the loop, right. And so that’s the real trick, you know, how do I get enough information to a remote human being to make a decision and then the tell the drone to deal with something.”

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